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Most research links (racial) essentialism to negative intergroup outcomes. We propose
that this conclusion reflects both a narrow conceptual focus on biological/genetic
essence and a narrow research focus from the perspective of racially dominant groups.
We distinguished between beliefs in biological and cultural essences, andwe investigated
the implications of this distinction for support of social justice policies (e.g., affirmative
action) among people with dominant (White) and subordinated (e.g., Black, Latino) racial
identities in the United States. Whereas, endorsement of biological essentialism may
have similarly negative implications for social justice policies across racial categories,
we investigated the hypothesis that endorsement of cultural essentialism would have
different implications across racial categories. In Studies 1a and 1b, we assessed the
properties of a cultural essentialism measure we developed using two samples with
different racial/ethnic compositions. In Study 2, we collected data from 170 participants
using an online questionnaire to test the implications of essentialist beliefs for policy
support. Consistent with previous research, we found that belief in biological essentialism
was negatively related to policy support for participants from both dominant and
subordinated categories. In contrast, the relationship between cultural essentialism and
policy support varied across identity categories in the hypothesized way: negative for
participants from the dominant category but positive for participants from subordinated
categories. Results suggest that cultural essentialism may provide a way of identification
that subordinated communities use to mobilize support for social justice.
Keywords: cultural essentialism, strategic essentialism, diversity, affirmative action, cultural inclusion,
immigration policy
INTRODUCTION
Essentialism refers to a lay belief in the existence of underlying natures that constitute and
differentiate social categories (e.g., Haslam et al., 2000, 2002; Bastian and Haslam, 2006). It entails
the tendency to understand social categories as expressions of discrete, fixed, natural, uniform, and
defining characteristics that are shared by all members, and are informative about them (Haslam
et al., 2000, 2002; Bastian and Haslam, 2006). Endorsement of essentialist beliefs has commonly
been associated with negative outcomes, such as legitimization of existing social hierarchies (Jost
et al., 2004; Keller, 2005; Williams and Eberhardt, 2008; Morton et al., 2009b), acceptance of racial
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inequality (Williams and Eberhardt, 2008), and anti-Black
prejudice among White Americans (Condit et al., 2004; Keller,
2005; Jayaratne et al., 2006; Andreychik and Gill, 2014).
Is racial essentialism necessarily negative and oppressive? We
propose that this standard verdict about essentialism results
from two features of most research. First, investigations of racial
essentialism typically understand the defining characteristics
of an identity category (i.e., race) in terms of a biological
essence. However, people may also understand racial categories
in terms of cultural characteristics, rather than purely biological
or genetic characteristics. The implications of such beliefs in a
cultural essence may be more open to various identity-relevant
interpretations. Second, most of the research that implicates
racial essentialist beliefs in the reproduction of social inequality
has exclusively considered the perspective of people in racially
dominant groups. However, people in marginalized or oppressed
communities might “strategically use a positive essentialism”
(Spivak, 1988, p. 13) as a basis for collective identity and political
action. We set out to expand research on racial essentialism by
(1) providing a more nuanced conceptualization of essentialism
as based on beliefs in different kinds of essences (biological versus
cultural), and (2) investigating the implications of biological
and cultural forms of essentialism for policy support among
dominant and subordinated racial groups.
The Essence of Essentialism
“Essence” is an elusive concept; it is difficult to define precisely
what comprises the imagined essence of an identity category
(Prentice and Miller, 2007). The literature commonly defines
racial essentialism as a belief in a genetic or biological essence that
defines all members of a racial category (e.g., Race Conceptions
Scale; Williams and Eberhardt, 2008; cf. Andreychik and Gill,
2014). Researchers have identified biological basis as one of
the dimensions of essentialism (Bastian and Haslam, 2006).
However, the imagined essence of a racial group need not be
biological; people also define racial groups in terms of particular
cultural characteristics, or conflate race and culture (e.g., No et al.,
2008; Hong et al., 2009; Morning, 2009). Relatedly, essentialist
beliefs about race can have implications for perceived cultural
differences and cultural identification (No et al., 2008). It is
possible for individuals to understand racial categories in terms
of essential cultural features. Cultural essentialism is the idea that
“[p]eople are ... more or less passive carriers of their culture,
whereby their attitudes, beliefs and achievements are supposed
to reflect typical cultural patterns” (Verkuyten, 2003, p. 385).
Applied to racial identity, cultural essentialism is the belief that
racial categories are associated with distinct, fixed, and stable
cultural patterns (e.g., values, beliefs, practices, and lifestyles);
these fixed cultural patterns definitively and permanently shape
the psychological characteristics of individuals within a racial
group, and differentiate them from members of other racial
groups. Cultural and biological forms of racial essentialism share
the idea that differences between racial groups are determined
by a fixed and uniform essence that resides within and defines
all members of each racial group. However, they differ in their
understanding of the nature of this essence. Both forms of
essentialism may coexist; indeed, many people perceive race as
having both biological and cultural foundations (Morning, 2011;
Byrd and Ray, 2015).
Research suggests that people strategically endorse or
downplay essentialism depending on identity concerns (Morton
et al., 2009a). Endorsement of (biological) essentialism is typically
greater among people who identify with dominant identity
categories (e.g., high social class rank; Kraus and Keltner, 2013).
For instance, endorsement of gender essentialism is stronger
amongmen than women, especially whenmale social dominance
is under threat (Morton et al., 2009b). Despite this tendency
of dominant group members to endorse essentialism, White
respondents—especially those who report high racial prejudice—
endorse essentialist ideas about their racial group less when they
perceive that White identity might cause them to be excluded
from some benefit (Morton et al., 2009a).
Results of a focus group study in the Netherlands suggest
that people can also use cultural forms of essentialism to
advance collective interests (Verkuyten, 2003). Specifically,
both ethnic minority and ethnic Dutch participants expressed
cultural essentialist ideas at times, but they did so for different
ends. For instance, ethnic minority participants expressed
cultural essentialist ideas to argue against assimilationist policies,
claiming that they could not possibly “become just like theDutch”
in order to fully integrate into Dutch society (Verkuyten, 2003,
p. 381). Ethnic Dutch participants expressed cultural essentialist
ideas—specifically, the belief that a person absorbs the ethnic
culture within which he/she is raised, with the implication that
Dutch and other ethnic groups are fundamentally different types
of person—to argue for restrictions on entry of immigrants
into the country (Verkuyten, 2003). However, ethnic Dutch
participants also discussed ethnic identity in non-essentialist
terms, particularly to argue that minority groups can—and
should—assimilate to Dutch culture (Verkuyten, 2003).
Turning the Lens: Research from the
Perspective of Marginalized Groups
Knowledge in mainstream psychological science has a
disproportionate basis in research from the perspective of
people from dominant groups (e.g., Arnett, 2008; Henrich
et al., 2010). In combination with the idea that people deploy
essentialism in a strategic fashion, this fact suggests a reason
why researchers have typically observed a negative association
between essentialism and egalitarian social policy (for exceptions
to research focusing exclusively on dominant viewpoints, see
No et al., 2008 and Williams and Eberhardt, 2008). People
from racially dominant groups tend to interpret and deploy
essentialism in ways that reproduce the unjust status quo. What
happens if we decolonize scientific gaze and consider the issue
of essentialism from the standpoint of marginalized or racially
subordinated identity positions?
Research suggests that people from subordinated categories
may often resist essentialist understandings; for example,
when they aim to overcome discrimination by challenging
constructions of an identity category as a homogeneous entity
(Verkuyten and Brug, 2004). This resistance may be particularly
true of biological essentialism of race. Historically, people have
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developed and deployed arguments about genetic differences
between racial groups to argue that certain groups of people are
naturally inferior in ability, fitness, or intelligence compared to
dominant groups, thereby legitimizing forms of racial oppression
such as colonialism, slavery, and segregation (Davis, 1991;
Smedley and Smedley, 2005; Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2011).
Given the historical role of beliefs in biologically determined
racial differences in justifying racial oppression, endorsement
of these beliefs is likely to be incompatible with support for
social justice policies, especially those designed to address racial
inequality by providing academic and occupational opportunities
to people from marginalized communities (e.g., various forms
of affirmative action). Endorsement of biological essentialism
is likely to be weaker among people from subordinated than
dominant identity categories, given the implications of such
beliefs for the assumed inferiority of subordinated groups
(Mahalingam, 2003). Since it is unlikely for genetic essentialist
beliefs to be deployed as grounds for collective identification or
advancement of group interests among subordinated groups, one
can hypothesize (H1) that endorsement of biological essentialism
in the context of racial categories will have the same negative
relationship with support for social justice policies among people
from dominant and subordinated categories.
Unlike biological essentialism, beliefs in cultural essentialism
may have more divergent implications for endorsement of social
justice policy. Similar to the case of biological essentialism,
among people from dominant categories, endorsement of
cultural essentialism may imply a belief that racial inequality
reflects the essential superiority of their own cultural practices
and essential inferiority of other practices. This belief may
undergird support for anti-egalitarian policies, especially those
designed to protect against symbolic threat to the dominant
cultural order (e.g., restrictive immigration; on the effect of
perceived symbolic threat on negative immigrant attitudes, see
Stephan et al., 2005; McLaren and Johnson, 2007). However, for
people from racially subordinated communities, endorsement
of cultural essentialism may not have the same implications.
Although one can certainly observe patterns of colonial mentality
(David and Okazaki, 2006) whereby people from subordinated
communities adopt dominant understandings of essential
inferiority, an enduring contribution of anti-colonial and ethnic
nationalist movements is to promote viewpoints that emphasize
the positive distinctiveness of subordinated community identity
(Fanon, 1963). These alternatives to dominant discourse
promote “models of identification” (Martín-Baró, 1994, p.
30) that constitute a foundation for collective action and
resistance (Simon and Klandermans, 2001). Consistent with
this idea, Mahalingam (2003) suggests that people from racially
subordinated groups are likely to endorse social or non-
biological varieties of essentialism to a greater extent than people
from dominant groups. Moreover, research among people from
marginalized ethnic minorities in the Netherlands indicates
that endorsement of cultural essentialist beliefs with regards to
one’s own ethnic group is associated with assertion of identity,
advocacy for recognition of cultural rights, and greater support
for multiculturalism (Verkuyten, 2003; Verkuyten and Brug,
2004). In summary, previous evidence for identity-enhancing
interpretations of cultural essentialism suggests a moderation
hypothesis (H2), whereby endorsement of cultural essentialism
has divergent implications for different identity categories:
negatively related to support for social justice policies among
people from dominant racial categories, but positively related
to support for social justice policies among people from
subordinated racial categories1.
Studies 1a and 1b: Scale Development
Before testing our hypotheses regarding the relationships
between the two forms of essentialism and policy support among
members of dominant and subordinated racial groups, we set out
to examine the reliability and construct validity of our measure of
cultural essentialism.We developed 12 items tomeasure beliefs in
cultural essentialism with respect to racial categories. We based
these items on existing definitions of cultural essentialism in
the literature (e.g., Verkuyten, 2003) to capture the belief that
each racial group has distinct and uniform cultural patterns,
which shape the individuals that identify with the group and
determine the kind of person they are. We included items in
our measure that tap various aspects of cultural patterns, such
as values, beliefs, lifestyle and behaviors. In Studies 1a and 1b, we
examined the properties of ourmeasure and how it relates to (and
is distinct from) relevant measures such as genetic essentialism,
implicit theories of race, and social dominance orientation, on




We recruited 196 participants online through our university
pool2. We excluded 23 participants from our analyses because
they failed two or more of our attention-check items. The final
sample composed of 173 participants (39.3% female, 35.3% male,
25% missing3; 69.4% White, 5.2% Latino, 3.5% Asian, 2.9%
African American, 8.1% mixed race and other, 11% missing).
Participants completed a set of questionnaires and received
partial course credit.
Measures
Participants completed the cultural essentialism measure (e.g.,
“Every racial group has a distinctive, defining culture of their
own” and “People raised in different racial communities learn to
1People can also deploy biological essentialist beliefs strategically to achieve
recognition or resist oppression. For instance, research indicates that certain
aspects of biological essentialist beliefs (e.g., immutability or uncontrollability)
attenuate anti-gay (Haslam and Levy, 2006) and anti-fat prejudice (Crandall and
Martinez, 1996), andmay serve as a basis for identification and collective resistance
against the oppression that accompanies such prejudices. In contrast, we propose
that, in the specific case of racial identity, cultural (but not biological) essentialist
beliefs about racial categories would be strategically deployed among subordinated
groups, given the role of biological essentialist beliefs in the history of colonialism
and slavery in the US.
2All studies reported in this paper conform to ethical standards for research with
human subjects, and have been approved by the Human Research Protection
Program of the University of Kansas.
3Gender (partially) and age information is missing due to an error with data
collection.
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behave, think and talk in ways defining of their racial group,” α
= 0.85), the Race Conceptions Scale (e.g., “The physical features
of different racial groups haven’t really changed much over
the centuries,” α = 0.76, Williams and Eberhardt, 2008), the
Implicit Person Theory measure (e.g., “Everyone is a certain kind
of person, and there is not much that they can do to really
change that,” α = 0.87, Chiu et al., 1997), Internal and External
Motivation to RespondWithout Prejudice Scales (e.g., “I attempt
to act in non-prejudiced ways toward Black people because it is
personally important to me” and “Because of today’s politically
correct standards I try to appear non-prejudiced toward Black
people,” αs = 0.87 and 0.80, respectively, Plant and Devine,
1998), Social Dominance Orientation Scale (e.g., “Some groups
of people are simply inferior to other groups,” α = 0.95, Pratto
et al., 1994), a measure of racial identification (e.g., “I feel strong
ties to other members of my racial/ethnic group,” α = 0.73,
Cameron, 2004), and the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability
Scale (e.g., “I have never deliberately said something that hurt
someone’s feelings,” Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). Participants
rated all items using 7-point Likert-type scales, ranging from 1
(Strongly Agree) to 7 (Strongly Disagree), except for the Social
Dominance Orientation Scale, for which the response options
ranged from 1 (Very Negative) to 7 (Very Positive). Following
the original scoring of the Social Desirability Scale, we recoded
the items as true or false (0 or 1, depending on the item) before
calculation of average scores.
Results
A factor analysis with maximum likelihood extraction and direct
oblimin rotation on the 12 items of our cultural essentialism
measure yielded two factors. The two factors did not map onto a
clear theoretical distinction. The scale had high reliability with all
items included (α = 0.85). We therefore proceeded to calculate a
cultural essentialism score composed of all 12 items. Scores on the
cultural essentialismmeasure showed a fairly normal distribution
(skewness = 0.031, SE = 0.19; kurtosis = 1.20, SE = 0.37). The
mean was above the midpoint of the rating scale (M = 4.45,
SD = 0.79). Women (M = 4.52, SD = 0.84) and men (M =
4.50, SD = 0.83) did not differ in their scores on the measure,
t(124) = 0.159, p = 0.9. Participants who identified with racial
categories other thanWhite scored slightly higher on the cultural
essentialism measure (M = 4.57, SD = 0.62) than participants
who identified as White (M = 4.41, SD = 0.86). This difference
was not significant, t(151) = −1.041, p = 0.3; however, we had
very few non-White participants (N = 34) compared to White
participants (N = 119) in our sample4.
Participants’ scores on the cultural essentialism measure
positively correlated with their scores on the Race Conceptions
Scale developed by Williams and Eberhardt (2008) as a measure
of beliefs in the genetically determined, fixed, and stable nature of
racial categories (r= 0.36, p= 0.00). This finding, which suggests
that participants who tend to essentialize race in genetic terms
also tend to believe in cultural essences underlying racial groups,
4Because of small sample size, we did not conduct separate correlation analyses
among non-White participants. The pattern of results does not change when
non-White participants are excluded from the analyses.
is in keeping with research by Morning (2011) showing that
people think of race as having both genetic and cultural bases.
However, the correlation is moderate in strength, suggesting
that the two constructs are distinct. Participants’ scores on the
cultural essentialism measure also positively correlated with the
Implicit Person Theory measure (r = 0.39, p = 0.00), which taps
the idea of fixedness of personality. Cultural essentialism scores
correlated positively with the External Motivation to Respond
Without Prejudice Scale (r = 0.19, p = 0.01), but negatively
with the Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice
Scale (r = −0.26, p = 0.001). This suggests that participants
who hold cultural essentialist beliefs about race are likely to be
concerned about not appearing prejudiced, rather than following
internal norms of being non-prejudiced. Participants’ scores
on the cultural essentialism measure positively correlated with
racial identification (r = 0.18, p = 0.01) and social dominance
orientation (r = 0.33, p = 0.00). Finally, scores on the cultural
essentialismmeasure did not correlate with the Social Desirability
Scale (r =−0.09, p= 0.25).
STUDY 1B
In Study 1a, our sample consisted of mostly White university
students. In keeping with the aim and hypotheses of our research,
in Study 1b, we specifically targeted non-White participants to
investigate whether our measure of cultural essentialism had a
similar structure and construct validity among participants from
subordinated racial groups.We expected the cultural essentialism
measure to show the same patterns of relationship with the
scales that we used in Study 1a, with the exception of social
dominance orientation: in line with H2, we did not expect a
positive relationship between cultural essentialism and social
dominance orientation among our non-White sample.
Methods
Participants and Procedure
We recruited 86 participants online through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk website, targeting participants who identify
with racial categories other than White. We excluded 3
participants from our analyses because they failed two or more
of our attention-check items. The final sample composed of 83
participants (44% female, 56% male; 50% African American,
18.3% Latino, 13.4% Asian, 12.2 Native American, 6% mixed
race and other, 1 missing). Participants completed a set of
questionnaires and received monetary compensation.
Measures
Participants completed the same set of measures as in Study
1a: the cultural essentialism measure (α = 0.88), the Race
Conceptions Scale (α = 0.86, Williams and Eberhardt, 2008),
Implicit Person Theory measure (α = 0.90, Chiu et al., 1997),
Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice
Scales (e.g., αs = 0.89 and 0.93, respectively, Plant and Devine,
1998), Social Dominance Orientation Scale (α = 0.98, Pratto
et al., 1994), Cameron’s (2004) measure of racial identification
(α = 0.84), and the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale
(Crowne and Marlowe, 1960).
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Results
A factor analysis with maximum likelihood extraction and direct
oblimin rotation on the 12 items of our cultural essentialism
measure yielded 3 factors. The factors did not map onto a clear
theoretical distinction. The scale had high reliability with all items
included (α = 0.88). As in Study 1a, we proceeded to calculate a
cultural essentialism score composed of all 12 items. Scores on the
cultural essentialismmeasure showed a fairly normal distribution
(skewness = −0.20, SE = 0.26; kurtosis = 1.34, SE = 0.52). The
mean was above the midpoint of the rating scale (M = 4.50, SD
= 0.95). Women (M = 4.55, SD = 1.10) and men (M = 4.46, SD
= 0.83) did not differ in their scores on the cultural essentialism
measure, t(82) =−0.43, p= 0.7.
As in Study 1a, participants’ scores on the cultural essentialism
measure positively and moderately correlated with their scores
on the Race Conceptions Scale (r = 0.47, p = 0.00).
Again, participants’ scores on the cultural essentialism measure
positively correlated with the Implicit Person Theory measure
(r = 0.36, p = 0.00), and the External Motivation to Respond
Without Prejudice Scale (r = 0.17, p = 0.12), but negatively
with the Internal Motivation to RespondWithout Prejudice Scale
(r = −0.15, p = 0.17), although the latter correlations were
not significant. Cultural essentialism scores positively correlated
with racial identification (r = 0.24, p = 0.03). However, unlike
in Study 1a, cultural essentialism did not show a significant
correlation with social dominance orientation (r = 0.10, p =
0.38), suggesting that among participants who identify with racial
categories other than the dominant White category, those who
endorse cultural essentialist beliefs do not necessarily endorse
social hierarchies. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis
that cultural essentialist beliefs are not necessarily incompatible
with a social justice orientation among people with subordinated
identities. Finally, endorsement of cultural essentialist beliefs was
not related with concerns about social desirability (r = −0.05, p
= 0.65).
Discussion
Studies 1a and 1b suggest that the cultural essentialism
measure we developed has sufficient internal consistency, and
shows construct validity, across two samples (Table 1). In
our mostly White sample (Study 1a) and non-White sample
(Study 1b), cultural essentialism showed similar relationships
with genetic essentialism, implicit person theory, external, and
internal motivation to respond without prejudice, and racial
identification. However, in our non-White sample (Study 1b), it
did not relate to social dominance orientation. This is in keeping
with our hypothesis (H2) regarding possible differences in the
implications of the endorsement of these beliefs across racial
categories, which we investigate directly in Study 2.
STUDY 2
We conducted an online survey study to test our hypotheses on
the relationship between cultural essentialism and policy support.
Specifically, we assessed the relationship between cultural and
biological forms of essentialism and support for social justice
policies (affirmative action, cultural inclusion, and demilitarized







Genetic Essentialism 0.36** 0.47**











Social Desirability −0.09 −0.05
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
border security) among racially dominantWhite participants and
participants from subordinated, non-White racial/ethnic groups
in the United States (US).
Methods
Participants and Procedure
We recruited 170 participants online through Mechanical
Turk [50.6% male, Mage = 36.1 (SD = 12.9), 56.5% White,
23.5% African American, 10.6% Latino, 4.1% Native American,
3.5% mixed race and other].5 Participants completed a set of
questionnaires and received monetary compensation.
Measures
All items weremeasured using 7-point Likert-type scales, ranging
from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 7 (Strongly Disagree). A complete list
of items appears in the Supplementary Materials.
Biological essentialism
As our aim in this study was to distinguish the correlates of
beliefs in cultural essences from beliefs in biological essences of
race, we used items that tap the genetic/biological component of
essentialism directly as our measure of biological essentialism, as
opposed to the Race Conceptions Scale (Williams and Eberhardt,
2008) that taps multiple components of essentialism.We adapted
four items from the Belief in Genetic Determinism scale (Keller,
2005) to measure the extent to which people believe genetic
factors definitively shape members of a racial category (e.g.,
“I think that differences between people of different races in
behavior and personality are largely determined by genetic
predisposition,” α = 0.91).
5Based on an a priori decision, we excluded data from an additional 22 participants
who indicated an Asian identity. People of Asian descent often occupy an
ambiguous position in the U.S. racial hierarchy—especially with respect to issues
of affirmative action—that is difficult to categorize along a binary, dominant-
subordinated distinction. Conclusions do not differ if one includes data fromAsian
participants in the subordinated category.
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Cultural essentialism
We used our 12-item scale to measure cultural essentialism (α =
0.88).
Policy support
We created threemeasures of policy support. Eight items assessed
support for affirmative action for racial minorities in the US
(e.g., “Companies should implement quotas to make sure racial
minorities are represented in their organization,” α = 0.88).
Five items assessed support for cultural inclusion of diverse
populations within the US (e.g., “American businesses, such
as supermarkets, should provide the option to print receipts
in multiple languages,” α = 0.78). Measures of support for
affirmative action and cultural inclusion focus on targets within
the US society; these policies may have direct implications for
the participants who are members of subordinated racial groups
in the US themselves. We also included a measure in our
study that focuses on policies regarding targets outside the US
society who intend to enter its geographic space. We used five
items assessed support for demilitarization of US borders, (e.g.,
“The U.S. government should reduce the number of Border
Patrol traffic checkpoints throughout the country,” α = 0.87).
This policy may or may not have direct implications for our
participants who identify with subordinated racial groups. We
included all three measures to explore whether essentialist beliefs
might relate particularly strongly to support for policies that are
directly relevant for the participants own racial/ethnic group (i.e.,
the former two policies for subordinated group members).
Demographics
Finally, participants indicated their age, gender, and racial
category identification in an open-ended format.
Results
We classified participants who reported identification as White,
Caucasian, or European as “dominant” (N = 94), and coded them
as “0.”We classified participants who reported identification with
any other racial category as “subordinated” and coded them as
“1” (N = 76).6 We use this binary race variable in all of the
analyses that follow. Bivariate correlations between key variables
6We use the terms “dominant” and “subordinated” to describe identities in terms
of power differentials (privileged versus disadvantaged status). This is a more
precise characterization than terms that denote numerical status (e.g., majority or
minority), which do not always correspond directly to power differentials (e.g., in
South Africa). We use the past participle subordinated rather than the adjective
andmeans and standard deviations as a function of racial identity
category appear in Tables 2, 3.
We conducted three-step hierarchical regression analyses
with support for social justice policy measures as outcomes.
Because participants in the dominant category were older (M
= 40.05, SD = 13.9) than participants in the subordinated
category (M = 31.22, SD = 9.5), t(168) = 4.70, p = 0.00),
we entered age in the first step of the analyses. In the second
step, we entered conceptual predictors: biological essentialism,
cultural essentialism, and racial category. In the third step, we
entered two-way interactions of racial category with each of the
two essentialism variables. These interaction terms assessed the
moderating effect of racial category on the relationship between
different forms of essentialism and each outcome variable.
Affirmative Action Support
The final model predicting affirmative action support was
significant, F(6, 163) = 5.993, p = 0.00, R
2
= 0.18 (Table 4).
Consistent with the identity moderation hypothesis (H2), results
revealed a significant interaction of racial category and cultural
essentialism, b = 0.65, SE = 0.19, t(163) = 3.32, p = 0.001,
CI [0.26, 1.03]. A probe of this interaction (Figure 1) revealed
the hypothesized pattern.7 Whereas the relationship between
cultural essentialism and support for affirmative action was
negative among participants in the dominant category (b =
−0.36, SE = 0.13, t = −2.77, p = 0.00), it was positive among
participants in the subordinated category (b = 0.29, SE = 0.14,
t = 1.98, p = 0.04). We also deconstructed the interaction
to test the racial category difference at low and high levels of
cultural essentialism. The racial category difference in support
for affirmative action was evident only among participants who
scored one standard deviation above the mean on cultural
essentialism (b = 0.92, SE = 0.25, t = 3.67, p = 0.00), but not
those who scored one standard deviation below the mean (b
= −0.28, SE = 0.25, t = −1.11, p = 0.27). Based on regions
of significance tests, the racial category difference emerged at
moderate to high (>0.3 SDs) levels of cultural essentialism.
The corresponding interaction of racial category and
endorsement of biological essentialism was not significant.
Independent of racial category, the hypothesized (H1) negative
relationship between biological essentialism and affirmative
subordinate to emphasize that the relative status is the result of societal oppression
rather than an inherent (or essential) feature of these groups.
7We used an online tool to probe all interactions we report (Preacher et al., 2006).
TABLE 2 | Correlations among key variables and means (and standard deviations) for the dominant racial category.
Biological essentialism Cultural essentialism Affirmative action Cultural inclusion Means (Standard deviations)
Biological Essentialism – 3.07 (1.54)
Cultural Essentialism 0.509** – 4.58 (0.96)
Affirmative Action −0.341** −0.406** – 3.79 (1.15)
Cultural Inclusion −0.550** −0.469** 0.495** – 4.74 (1.35)
Demilitarized Borders −0.398** −0.458** 0.570** 0.683** 3.63 (1.58)
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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TABLE 3 | Correlations among key variables and means (and standard deviations) for the subordinated racial category.
Biological essentialism Cultural essentialism Affirmative action Cultural inclusion Means (Standard deviations)
Biological Essentialism – 3.44 (1.52)
Cultural Essentialism 0.323** – 4.59 (0.88)
Affirmative Action 0.126 0.250* – 4.19 (1.07)
Cultural Inclusion −0.431** 0.077 0.229** – 5.05 (1.57)
Demilitarized Borders −0.268* −0.047 0.190 0.438** 3.90 (1.60)
TABLE 4 | Hierarchical regression for affirmative action support.
Total Sample (N = 170) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables β β β
Age −0.17* −0.12 −0.13
Biological Essentialism (Bio Ess) – −0.11 −0.20
Cultural Essentialism (Cul Ess) – −0.09 −0.29**
Racial Category (Race) – 0.15 0.14
Bio Ess*Race – – 0.17
Cul Ess*Race – – 0.33**
R2 0.03 0.07 0.18
Numerical entries represent standardized regression coefficients.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
FIGURE 1 | The Interaction between cultural essentialism and racial category
on affirmative action support. Other variables included in the model are age
and biological essentialism.
action support approached conventional levels of statistical
significance, b = −0.15, SE = 0.08, t(163) = −1.84, p = 0.067, CI
[−0.31, 0.01].
Support for Cultural Inclusion
The final model predicting support for cultural inclusion was
significant, F(6, 163) = 13.836, p < 0.001, R
2
= 0.34 (Table 5).
Consistent with the identity moderation hypothesis (H2), results
revealed a significant interaction of racial category and cultural
essentialism, b = 0.76, SE = 0.22, t = 3.36, p = 0.001, CI [0.31,
1.20]. A probe of this interaction (Figure 2) again revealed the
hypothesized pattern. Whereas the relationship between cultural
essentialism and support for cultural inclusion was negative
among participants in the dominant category (b = −0.32, SE =
0.15, t = −2.14, p = 0.03), it was positive among participants
TABLE 5 | Hierarchical regression on support for cultural inclusion.
Total Sample (N = 170) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables β β β
Age −0.20** −0.21** −0.21**
Biological Essentialism (Bio Ess) – −0.50** −0.42**
Cultural Essentialism (Cul Ess) – 0.01 −0.21*
Racial Category (Race) – 0.10 0.10
Bio Ess*Race – – −0.08
Cul Ess*Race – – 0.31**
R2 0.04 0.29 0.34
Numerical entries represent standardized regression coefficients.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
FIGURE 2 | The interaction between cultural essentialism and racial category
on support for cultural inclusion. Other variables included in the model are age
and biological essentialism.
in the subordinated category (b = 0.43, SE = 0.17, t = 2.59, p
= 0.01). The racial category difference was evident only among
participants who scored one standard deviation above the mean
on cultural essentialism (b= 0.98, SE= 0.29, t = 3.42, p= 0.00),
but not those who scored one standard deviation below the mean
(b=−0.41, SE = 0.29, t =−1.43, p= 0.15). Based on regions of
significance tests, the racial category difference emerged among
those who scored moderate to high (>0.15 SDs) on the measure
of cultural essentialism.
The corresponding interaction of racial category and
endorsement of biological essentialism was not significant.
Consistent with hypothesis H1 and independent of racial
category, biological essentialism was a significant negative
predictor of support for cultural inclusion, b=−0.40, SE= 0.09,
t =−4.21, p= 0.00, CI [−0.59,−0.21].
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Support for Demilitarized Borders
The final model predicting support for demilitarization of the
borders was significant, F(6, 163) = 7.645, p < 0.001, R
2
= 0.22
(Table 6). Consistent with the identity moderation hypothesis
(H2), results revealed a significant interaction of racial category
and cultural essentialism, b = 0.61, SE = 0.27, t = 2.28, p
= 0.023, CI [0.08, 1.1]. A probe of this interaction (Figure 3)
revealed that the relationship between cultural essentialism and
support for reducedmilitarization of border security was negative
among participants in the dominant category (b = −0.53, SE
= 0.18, t = −2.95, p = 0.003), but not among participants in
the subordinated category (b = 0.08, SE = 0.20, t = 0.42, p =
0.67). The racial category difference in support for demilitarized
borders was evident only among participants who scored one
standard deviation above the mean on cultural essentialism (b
= 0.67, SE = 0.34, t = 1.95, p = 0.05), but not those who
scored one standard deviation below the mean (b = −0.45, SE
= 0.34, t = −1.34, p = 0.18). Based on regions of significance
tests, the racial category difference emerged only among those
who scored higher (>0.95 SDs) on the measure of cultural
essentialism.
The corresponding interaction of racial category and
endorsement of biological essentialism was not significant.
Consistent with hypothesis H1 and independent of
racial category, biological essentialism was a significant
negative predictor of support for demilitarization of the
border, b = −0.27, SE = 0.11, t = −2.37, p = 0.02,
CI [−0.49,−0.04].
Discussion
Study 2 documented that correlates of cultural and biological
forms of essentialism vary across racially dominant White
participants and participants from subordinated, non-White
racial/ethnic groups. Specifically, endorsing cultural essentialist
beliefs positively predicted support for affirmative action and
for cultural inclusion, and was unrelated to support for
demilitarized border security, among those who identified
with subordinated racial categories; these relationships were
negative among those who identified with the dominant racial
category.
TABLE 6 | Hierarchical regression on support for demilitarized borders.
Total Sample (N = 170) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables β β β
Age −0.22** −0.23** −0.23**
Biological Essentialism (Bio Ess) – −0.29** −0.26*
Cultural Essentialism (Cul Ess) – −0.15 −0.31**
Racial Category (Race) – 0.03 0.03
Bio Ess*Race – – −0.02
Cul Ess*Race – – 0.23*
R2 0.05 0.19 0.22
Numerical entries represent standardized regression coefficients.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Conventional understandings propose that endorsement of
essentialism is negatively related to support for social justice
outcomes. A decolonial perspective rooted in the epistemic
standpoint of people in marginalized groups suggests otherwise.
In particular, results of the present research suggest that
conventional understandings aremore precisely true of biological
essentialism—the belief that racial categories are constituted
and defined by underlying biological or genetic characteristics.
In line with research that has documented similar correlates
of biological essentialism among participants of various racial
backgrounds (Williams and Eberhardt, 2008), endorsement of
biological essentialism was associated with lower support for
social justice policy among participants from both dominant and
subordinated identity categories in our study.
Building on previous research on the cultural features
associated with racial categories (No et al., 2008; Hong et al., 2009;
Morning, 2009), we document that people can also understand
racial essentialism in terms of distinct and defining cultural
patterns. Our results indicate patterns of relationship for cultural
essentialism that diverged from conventional understandings in
hypothesized ways. Among participants from dominant identity
categories, results for both biological and cultural essentialism
were similar, and resembled conventional understandings of
essentialism. In contrast, among participants from subordinated
identity categories, endorsement of cultural essentialism was
more compatible with support for egalitarian policy, especially
affirmative action and cultural inclusion.
In general, endorsement of cultural essentialism among
participants from subordinated identity categories was positively
associated with support for egalitarian policy. This relationship
was especially true of support for affirmative action and cultural
inclusion, but it did not reach conventional levels of statistical
significance for the demilitarization of border security measure.
These findings are in line with the proposition that different kinds
of essentialism may have divergent implications for policies that
refer to targets within (affirmative action and cultural inclusion)
vs. outside (demilitarization of borders) one’s society. Regardless
of racial category, endorsement of cultural essentialism might
be associated with doubts about the cultural assimilability of
FIGURE 3 | The interaction between cultural essentialism and racial category
on support for demilitarized borders. Other variables included in the model are
age and biological essentialism.
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immigrants, and a concern that immigration constitutes a
symbolic threat to the dominant cultural order, which might
increase support for border policing to protect against this
threat. If so, then this might explain why endorsement of
cultural essentialism was not positively related to support for
demilitarized borders among participants with subordinated
identities, unlike support for the other two policies.
One limitation of our studies is that, because of limited
sample size, we combined participants who identify with different
racial categories under a monolithic “subordinated” category.
This categorization overlooks important features of historical
engagement with dominant racial communities, which might
lead to different implications of essentialism beliefs for different
racial groups. An important direction for future work is to
investigate the implications of different types of essentialism
among people who identify with different racial categories
without essentializing various racial groups as a unified category.
Despite its limitations, the conceptual contribution of the
current research is to illuminate how endorsement of (cultural)
essentialism might afford support for social justice policies,
especially among people from marginalized racial communities.
Support for social justice policies is often greater among
people from subordinated identity categories (i.e., the intended
recipients) than people from dominant categories (e.g., Lowery
et al., 2006). Results of the present research suggest that this effect
is particularly true among people who show moderate to high
endorsement of cultural essentialism. This pattern is consistent
with the idea that some form of essentialism may be necessary
to afford the imagination of community that underlies collective
identification, buffers well-being in the face of oppression
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmitt et al., 2003); and provides a
foundation for collective action (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2008;
Haslam and Reicher, 2012). Cultural forms of essentialism may
serve this purpose for people from subordinated communities
without the negative connotations inherent in biological forms
of essentialism, particularly for public support of policies aimed
at correcting the social processes that lead to inequality.
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